Related papers: Matching markets with farsighted couples
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Two sets of objects of size $n$ are to be matched to each other based on i.i.d. costs associated to every pair of objects. Objects prefer to be matched as cheaply as possible, and a matching is said to be stable if there is no pair of…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's expected characteristics. Specifically, across all stable…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…