Related papers: Matching markets with farsighted couples
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different…
The topic of stable matchings (marriages) in a bipartite graph has become widely popular, starting with the appearance of the classical work by Gale and Shapley. We give a detailed survey on selected known results in this field that…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…
We analyze an unusual class of bosonic dynamical instabilities that arise from dissipative (or non-Hermitian) pairing interactions. We show that, surprisingly, a completely stable dissipative pairing interaction can be combined with simple…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
Random pairwise encounters often occur in large populations, or groups of mobile agents, and various types of local interactions that happen at encounters account for emergent global phenomena. In particular, in the fields of swarm…
The stable Ramsey's theorem for pairs has been the subject of numerous investigations in mathematical logic. We introduce a weaker form of it by restricting from the class of all stable colorings to subclasses of it that are non-null in a…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…
We study a generalization of the model of a dark market due to Duffie-G\^arleanu- Pedersen [6]. Our market is segmented and involves multiple assets. We show that this market has a unique asymptotically stable equilibrium. In order to…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…