Related papers: A Partial Order for Strictly Positive Coalitional …
We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive…
In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
We study cautious reasoning in finite sequential games played by agents with perfect recall. Our contribution lies in formulating a definition of prudent rationalizability (Heifetz et al. 2021, BEJTE) as an iterative reduction procedure of…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates…
Horizontal agreements can fall within the scope of exemptions to antitrust competition if they are expected to create pro-consumer benefits. Inspired by such horizontal agreements, we introduce a cooperative game in which a set of transport…
We introduce a way to compare actions in decision problems. One action is safer than another if the set of beliefs at which the decision-maker prefers the safer action expands as the decision-maker becomes more risk averse. We provide a…
Several extensions of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value to the family of games with a priori unions are proposed in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2020) ``On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori…
Over the years, numerous experiments have been accumulated to show that cooperation is not casual and depends on the payoffs of the game. These findings suggest that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
We propose a relaxation of common belief called factional belief that is suitable for the analysis of strategic coordination on social networks. We show how this definition can be used to analyze revolt games on general graphs, including by…
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…