Related papers: Partition-based Stability of Coalitional Games

We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…

We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition.…

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…

We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…

This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…

We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…

Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…

In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…

Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…

We consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertainty in the coalitional values. We provide a novel methodology to study the stability of the grand coalition in the case where each coalition constructs ambiguity sets for the (possibly)…

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents…

Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…

An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…