Related papers: Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games
Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
We describe an efficient algorithm to compute solutions for the general two-player Blotto game on n battlefields with heterogeneous values. While explicit constructions for such solutions have been limited to specific, largely symmetric or…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
Federated learning promises significant sample-efficiency gains by pooling data across multiple agents, yet incentive misalignment is an obstacle: each update is costly to the contributor but boosts every participant. We introduce a…
This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function of the difference between the two players' allocations. This paper severely reduces the…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
We propose a novel decision making framework for forming potential collaboration among otherwise competing agents in subsurface systems. The agents can be, e.g., groundwater, CO$_2$, or hydrogen injectors and extractors with conflicting…
We consider a multi-player multi-armed bandit setting in the presence of adversaries that attempt to negatively affect the rewards received by the players in the system. The reward distributions for any given arm are heterogeneous across…
As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
This paper presents a multi-team collaboration strategy based on Hamilton's rule from ecology that facilitates resource allocation among multiple teams, where agents are considered as shared resource among all teams that must be allocated…
We study the emergence of altruistic behaviour in collective games. In particular, we take into account Toral's version of collective Parrondo's paradoxical games, in which the redistribution of capital between agents, who can play…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
The basic social dilemma is frequently captured by a public goods game where participants decide simultaneously whether to support a common pool or not and after the enhanced contributions are distributed uniformly among all competitors.…
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…