Related papers: Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment
This paper introduces a novel concept for addressing non-convexity in the cost functions of distributed economic model predictive control (DEMPC) systems. Specifically, the proposed algorithm enables agents to self-organize into a hierarchy…
A basic combinatorial online resource allocation problem is considered, where multiple servers have individual capacity constraints, and at each time slot, a set of jobs arrives, that have potentially different weights to different servers.…
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…
Unexpected advertising items in sponsored search may reduce users' reliance on organic search, resulting in hidden cost for the e-commerce platform. To address this problem and promote sustainable growth, we propose a dynamic reserve price…
We study a general allocation setting where agent valuations are concave additive. In this model, a collection of items must be uniquely distributed among a set of agents, where each agent-item pair has a specified utility. The objective is…
Conformal prediction is an uncertainty quantification method that constructs a prediction set for a previously unseen datum, ensuring the true label is included with a predetermined coverage probability. Adaptive conformal prediction has…
We study a contest in which $N$ players sequentially draw from a distribution as many times as they want at a fixed cost per draw, with no recall, and the highest accepted value wins a prize. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of impressive results, the performance of most posted price mechanisms however, rely…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immediately and irrevocably, to one of n agents. Agent i assigns…
Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
The optimization of expensive-to-evaluate black-box functions over combinatorial structures is an ubiquitous task in machine learning, engineering and the natural sciences. The combinatorial explosion of the search space and costly…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…