Related papers: Dynamic Combinatorial Assignment
In the bin covering problem, the goal is to fill as many bins as possible up to a certain minimal level with a given set of items of different sizes. Online variants, in which the items arrive one after another and have to be packed…
The theory of discrete-time online learning has been successfully applied in many problems that involve sequential decision-making under uncertainty. However, in many applications including contractual hiring in online freelancing platforms…
This paper presents karma mechanisms, a novel approach to the repeated allocation of a scarce resource among competing agents over an infinite time. Examples include deciding which ride hailing trip requests to serve during peak demand,…
We consider a context-dependent ranking and selection problem. The best design is not universal but depends on the contexts. Under a Bayesian framework, we develop a dynamic sampling scheme for context-dependent optimization (DSCO) to…
We present a possible kind of generalization of the notion of ordered pairs of cyclic maps and coupled fixed points and its application in modelling of equilibrium in oligopoly markets. We have obtained sufficient conditions for the…
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly…
Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates…
We investigate the distributed online economic dispatch problem for power systems with time-varying coupled inequality constraints. The problem is formulated as a distributed online optimization problem in a multi-agent system. At each time…
We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…
This article investigates the problem of dynamic spectrum access for canonical wireless networks, in which the channel states are time-varying. In the most existing work, the commonly used optimization objective is to maximize the…
In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies…
We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its…
The environments, in which autonomous cars act, are high-risky, dynamic, and full of uncertainty, demanding a continuous update of their sensory information and knowledge bases. The frequency of facing an unknown object is too high making…
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…