Related papers: Externalities in Chore Division
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
In economic theory, the concept of externality refers to any indirect effect resulting from an interaction between players that affects the social welfare. Most of the models within which externality has been studied assume that agents have…
We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…
The classic house allocation problem is primarily concerned with finding a matching between a set of agents and a set of houses that guarantees some notion of economic efficiency (e.g. utilitarian welfare). While recent works have shifted…
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…
We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency to groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness requires…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to…
We study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a group of agents, where each agent $i$ has a non-negative weight $w_i$ that represents its obligation for undertaking the chores. We consider the fairness notion of weighted…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…
In this paper, we consider the problem of fair division of indivisible goods when the allocation of goods impacts society. Specifically, we introduce a second valuation function for each agent, determining the social impact of allocating a…
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…
We study several fairness notions in allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive values) to agents who have additive and submodular cost functions. The fairness criteria we are concern with are envy-free up to any item…
We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with possibly different weights, aiming for a solution that is both fair and efficient. Specifically, we focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality…