Related papers: Externalities in Chore Division
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores to a group of n agents, each of which has a general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocations are not guaranteed to exist, we consider…
We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by…
Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of…
We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-only setting, we show that an allocation satisfying…
Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed…
Debate about fairness in machine learning has largely centered around competing definitions of what fairness or nondiscrimination between groups requires. However, little attention has been paid to what precisely a group is. Many recent…
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they…
Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents. The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of the cake (i.e. one agent may like chocolate…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…
In this article we study a cake cutting problem. More precisely, we study symmetric fair division algorithms, that is to say we study algorithms where the order of the players do not influence the value obtained by each player. In the first…
The recent years have seen interest into the possibility for (classical as well as quantum) causal structures that, while remaining logically consistent, feature a cyclic causal order between events, opening intriguing possibilities for new…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…
In today's dynamic and interconnected world, resource constraints pose significant challenges across various domains, ranging from networks, logistics and manufacturing to project management and optimization, etc. Resource-constrained…
The classic house allocation problem involves assigning $m$ houses to $n$ agents based on their utility functions, ensuring each agent receives exactly one house. A key criterion in these problems is satisfying fairness constraints such as…