Related papers: Fisher Markets with Social Influence
This paper proposes a peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help the centralized power system to reduce the total electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which…
A financial market is a system resulting from the complex interaction between participants in a closed economy. We propose a minimal microscopic model of the financial market economy based on the real economy's symmetry constraint and…
We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…
This paper investigates the game theory of resource-allocation situations where the "first come, first serve" heuristic creates inequitable, asymmetric benefits to the players. Specifically, this problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash…
The recent rise of renewable energy produced by many decentralized sources yields interesting market design challenges for electrical grids. Balancing supply and demand in such networks is both a temporal and spatial challenge due to…
In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg…
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers,…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
We propose a stochastic game modelling the strategic interaction between market makers and traders of optimal execution type. For traders, the permanent price impact commonly attributed to them is replaced by quoting strategies implemented…
As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular prices, or in other words, that they are…
In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the…
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and…
In this work, we consider dynamic influence maximization games over social networks with multiple players (influencers). The goal of each influencer is to maximize their own reward subject to their limited total budget rate constraints.…
In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…
Constant and symmetric price impact functions, most commonly used in agent-based market modelling, are shown to give rise to paradoxical and inconsistent outcomes in the simplest case of arbitrage exploitation when open-hold-close actions…
We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,…