Related papers: Fisher Markets with Social Influence
We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…
We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…
Competition has been introduced in the electricity markets with the goal of reducing prices and improving efficiency. The basic idea which stays behind this choice is that, in competitive markets, a greater quantity of the good is exchanged…
We consider a Nash equilibrium between two high-frequency traders in a simple market impact model with transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs. Extending a result by Sch\"oneborn (2008), we prove existence and…
In competitive supply chains (SCs), pricing decisions are crucial, as they directly impact market share and profitability. Traditional SC models often assume continuous pricing for mathematical convenience, overlooking the practical reality…
Rating systems play a vital role in the exponential growth of service-oriented markets. As highly rated online services usually receive substantial revenue in the markets, malicious sellers seek to boost their service evaluation by…
We propose a generalization of the Bass diffusion model in discrete-time that explicitly models the effect of price in adoption. Our model is different from earlier price-incorporated models and fits well to adoption data for various…
Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such…
We look at discovering the impact of market microstructure on equitability for market participants at public exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. Are these environments equitable venues for low-frequency participants…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
In this paper, the problem of smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
We consider a network of interacting agents and we model the process of choice on the adoption of a given innovative product by means of statistical-mechanics tools. The modelization allows us to focus on the effects of direct interactions…
This study investigates the prevention of market manipulation using a price-impact model of financial market trading as a linear system. First, I define a trading game between speculators such that they implement a manipulation trading…
We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model involving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large, we…
We studied the behavior and variation of utility between the two conflicting players in a closed Nash-equilibrium loop. Our modeling approach also captured the nexus between optimal premium strategizing and firm performance using the…
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…