Related papers: Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-d…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective for each leader is to reach a state…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…
McFadden and Richter (1991) and later McFadden (2005) show that the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference characterizes rationalizability of choice probabilities through random utility models on finite universal choice spaces. This note…
LLMs are increasingly used to make or support high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, where alignment depends not only on factual accuracy but on how models weigh tradeoffs between different outcomes. We present an empirical pipeline for…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…
Real-world recommendation systems often consist of two phases. In the first phase, multiple predictive models produce the probability of different immediate user actions. In the second phase, these predictions are aggregated according to a…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. However, they often admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic…
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…
Decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes with communication (Dec-POMDP-Com) provide a framework for multiagent decision making under uncertainty, but the NEXP-complete complexity for finite-horizon problems renders…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
We consider the issue of strategic behaviour in various peer-assessment tasks, including peer grading of exams or homeworks and peer review in hiring or promotions. When a peer-assessment task is competitive (e.g., when students are graded…