Related papers: Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: …
One approach to risk-limiting audits (RLAs) compares randomly selected cast vote records (CVRs) to votes read by human auditors from the corresponding ballot cards. Historically, such methods reduce audit sample sizes by considering how…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are rigorous statistical procedures meant to detect invalid election results. RLAs examine paper ballots cast during the election to statistically assess the possibility of a disagreement between the winner…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect reported outcomes before the outcomes are certified. The most efficient use ballot-level comparison, comparing the voting system's interpretation of individual…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can use information about which ballot cards contain which contests (card-style data, CSD) to ensure that each contest receives adequate scrutiny, without examining more cards than necessary. RLAs using CSD in…
ONEAudit provides more efficient risk-limiting audits than other extant methods when the voting system cannot report a cast-vote record linked to each cast card. It obviates the need for re-scanning; it is simpler and more efficient than…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are post-election auditing procedures that rigorously guarantee a specified maximum probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will not be detected. Aside from ready access to physical ballots, known RLAs…
U.S. elections rely heavily on computers such as voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks, voting machines, scanners, tabulators, and results reporting websites. These introduce digital threats to election outcomes. Risk-limiting…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can provide routine, affirmative evidence that reported election outcomes are correct by checking a random sample of cast ballots. An efficient RLA requires checking relatively few ballots. Here we construct…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are a significant tool in increasing confidence in the accuracy of elections. They consist of randomized algorithms which check that an election's vote tally, as reported by a vote tabulation system, corresponds…
A Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) is a statistical election tabulation audit with a rigorous error guarantee. We present ballot polling RLA PROVIDENCE, an audit with the efficiency of MINERVA and flexibility of BRAVO. We prove that PROVIDENCE is…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) offer a statistical guarantee: if a full manual tally of the paper ballots would show that the reported election outcome is wrong, an RLA has a known minimum chance of leading to a full manual tally. RLAs…
In the context of election security, a Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) is a statistical framework that uses a minimal partial recount of the ballots to guarantee that the results of the election were correctly reported. A generalized RLA…
Colorado conducted risk-limiting tabulation audits (RLAs) across the state in 2017, including both ballot-level comparison audits and ballot-polling audits. Those audits only covered contests restricted to a single county; methods to…
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are techniques for verifying the outcomes of large elections. While they provide rigorous guarantees of correctness, widespread adoption has been impeded by both efficiency concerns and the fact they offer…
An election audit is risk-limiting if the audit limits (to a pre-specified threshold) the chance that an erroneous electoral outcome will be certified. Extant methods for auditing instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections are either not…
Accurately determining the outcome of an election is a complex task with many potential sources of error, ranging from software glitches in voting machines to procedural lapses to outright fraud. Risk-limiting audits (RLA) are statistically…
Risk-limiting post election audits guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect election results, independent of why the result was incorrect. Ballot-polling audits select ballots at random and interpret those ballots as evidence…
We propose a simple risk-limiting audit for elections, ClipAudit. To determine whether candidate A (the reported winner) actually beat candidate B in a plurality election, ClipAudit draws ballots at random, without replacement, until either…
The main risk-limiting ballot polling audit in use today, BRAVO, is designed for use when single ballots are drawn at random and a decision regarding whether to stop the audit or draw another ballot is taken after each ballot draw…
SOBA is an approach to election verification that provides observers with justifiably high confidence that the reported results of an election are consistent with an audit trail ("ballots"), which can be paper or electronic. SOBA combines…