Related papers: Time-inconsistent contract theory
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…
This paper investigates a time-inconsistent portfolio selection problem in the incomplete mar ket model, integrating expected utility maximization with risk control. The objective functional balances the expected utility and variance on log…
We develop the dynamic programming approach for a family of infinite horizon boundary control problems with linear state equation and convex cost. We prove that the value function of the problem is the unique regular solution of the…
Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from…
This paper considers the infinite horizon optimal control problem for nonlinear systems. Under the condition of nonlinear controllability of the system to any terminal set containing the origin and forward invariance of the terminal set, we…
We consider discrete-time infinite horizon deterministic optimal control problems with nonnegative cost per stage, and a destination that is cost-free and absorbing. The classical linear-quadratic regulator problem is a special case. Our…
We consider a discrete-time financial market model with finite time horizon and give conditions which guarantee the existence of an optimal strategy for the problem of maximizing expected terminal utility. Equivalent martingale measures are…
An optimal control problem with an infinite horizon quadratic cost functional for a linear system with a known additive disturbance is considered. The feature of this problem is that a weight matrix of the control cost in the cost…
We study an exit contract design problem, where one provides a universal exit contract to multiple heterogeneous agents, with which each agent chooses an optimal (exit) stopping time. The problem consists in optimizing the universal exit…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a Principal-Agent approach. The Principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of…
We characterize the value of swing contracts in continuous time as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with suitable boundary conditions. The case of contracts with penalties is straightforward, and in that…
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts -- known in economics…
We investigate an optimal reinsurance problem for an insurance company facing a constant fixed cost when the reinsurance contract is signed. The insurer needs to optimally choose both the starting time of the reinsurance contract and the…
I use a novel approach to compare information in several classes of moral hazard problems: implementability, cost under risk neutrality and limited liability, and cost facing an agent with a general preference for money. Incentives in moral…
In this article we consider the infinite-horizon Merton investment-consumption problem in a constant-parameter Black - Scholes - Merton market for an agent with constant relative risk aversion R. The classical primal approach is to write…
This paper addresses a continuous-time contracting model that extends the problem introduced by Sannikov and later rigorously analysed by Possama\"{i} and Touzi. In our model, a principal hires a risk-averse agent to carry out a project.…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. In…
In control theory, typically a nominal model is assumed based on which an optimal control is designed and then applied to an actual (true) system. This gives rise to the problem of performance loss due to the mismatch between the true model…
We give a new formulation of the relative arbitrage problem from stochastic portfolio theory that asks for a time horizon beyond which arbitrage relative to the market exists in all ``sufficiently volatile'' markets. In our formulation,…