Related papers: Information Design with Elicitation and Strategic …

We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…

We propose a new approach for solving a class of discrete decision making problems under uncertainty with positive cost. This issue concerns multiple and diverse fields such as engineering, economics, artificial intelligence, cognitive…

We consider a Gaussian interference channel with independent direct and cross link channel gains, each of which is independent and identically distributed across time. Each transmitter-receiver user pair aims to maximize its long-term…

We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…

This paper is concerned with the stochastic linear quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information, where the diffusion terms contain the control and state variables. Here the term "overlapping" means that there are…

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…

We consider a continuous-time linear-quadratic Gaussian control problem with partial observations and costly information acquisition. More precisely, we assume the drift of the state process to be governed by an unobservable…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…

We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…

In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network,…

We develop an empirical framework for analyzing dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the analyst. We introduce \textit{Markov correlated equilibrium}, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and…

This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…

We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur…

The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…

This paper examines the optimal design of information sharing in organizations. Organizational performance depends on agents adapting to uncertain external environments while coordinating their actions, where coordination incentives and…

Poker is in the family of imperfect information games unlike other games such as chess, connect four, etc which are perfect information game instead. While many perfect information games have been solved, no non-trivial imperfect…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…