Related papers: Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Cost…
We study envy-free up to any item (EFX) allocations on simple graphs where vertices and edges represent agents and items respectively. An agent (vertex) is only interested in items (edges) that are incident to her and all other items always…
The fair allocation of indivisible resources is a fundamental problem. Existing research has developed various allocation mechanisms or algorithms to satisfy different fairness notions. For example, round robin (RR) was proposed to meet the…
Fairness and efficiency have become the pillars of modern fair division research, but prior work on achieving both simultaneously is largely limited to the unconstrained setting. We study fair and efficient allocations of indivisible goods…
The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental open problem in discrete fair division. Given a set of agents and indivisible goods, the goal is to determine the existence of an allocation where no agent envies another following the…
We study the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among a set of agents under the fairness notion of Any Price Share (APS). APS is known to dominate the widely studied Maximin share (MMS). Since an exact APS allocation may not…
A challenge in fair algorithm design is that, while there are compelling notions of individual fairness, these notions typically do not satisfy desirable composition properties, and downstream applications based on fair classifiers might…
The greedy algorithm for monotone submodular function maximization subject to cardinality constraint is guaranteed to approximate the optimal solution to within a $1-1/e$ factor. Although it is well known that this guarantee is essentially…
We extend the work of Narasimhan and Bilmes [30] for minimizing set functions representable as a difference between submodular functions. Similar to [30], our new algorithms are guaranteed to monotonically reduce the objective function at…
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under cardinality constraints, where each agent must receive a bundle of fixed size. This models practical scenarios, such as assigning shifts or forming equally sized teams. Recently,…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair and economically efficient manner. In this context, the Nash social welfare-defined as the geometric mean of agents' valuations for their assigned bundles-stands as…
The research in parallel machine scheduling in combinatorial optimization suggests that the desirable parallel efficiency could be achieved when the jobs are sorted in the non-increasing order of processing times. In this paper, we find…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward function. While prior work largely focuses on unconstrained…
We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…
We consider the problem of online assignment of indivisible chores under \MMS\ criteria. The previous work proves that any deterministic online algorithm for chore division has a competitive ratio of at least 2. In this work, we improve…
We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly…
We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the…