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Related papers: Transaction Fee Mining and Mechanism Design

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To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both the users and the miner, and is…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-02-14 Yotam Gafni , Aviv Yaish

In 2021 Ethereum adjusted the transaction pricing mechanism by implementing EIP-1559, which introduces the base fee - a network fee that is burned and dynamically adjusts to the network demand. The authors of the Ethereum Improvement…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-08-09 Sarah Azouvi , Guy Goren , Lioba Heimbach , Alexander Hicks

We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-05-27 Pranav Garimidi , Lioba Heimbach , Tim Roughgarden

Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of TFMs and proposed three requirements: user incentive…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 Hao Chung , Tim Roughgarden , Elaine Shi

Blockchain systems often employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into hashchains. These protocols stimulate competition among miners in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash computation in Bitcoin) in…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-05-13 Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla , Lav R. Varshney

In recent years, prominent blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have experienced explosive growth in transaction volume, leading to frequent surges in demand for limited block space and causing transaction fees to fluctuate by…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , Daniel J. Moroz , David C. Parkes , Mitchell Stern

Blockchain networks are facing increasingly heterogeneous computational demands, and in response, protocol designers have started building specialized infrastructure to supply that demand. This paper introduces Resonance: a new kind of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-11-20 Maryam Bahrani , Naveen Durvasula

In permissionless blockchains, transaction issuers include a fee to incentivize miners to include their transactions. To accurately estimate this prioritization fee for a transaction, transaction issuers (or blockchain participants, more…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-05-25 Johnnatan Messias , Vabuk Pahari , Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran , Krishna P. Gummadi , Patrick Loiseau

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-11-14 Itay Tsabary , Ittay Eyal

In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple "pay your bid" auction has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2018-11-13 Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-24 Yunshu Liu , Zhixuan Fang , Man Hon Cheung , Wei Cai , Jianwei Huang

A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and…

General Economics · Economics 2025-08-11 Yulin Liu , Yuxuan Lu , Kartik Nayak , Fan Zhang , Luyao Zhang , Yinhong Zhao

Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-02-21 Elaine Shi , Hao Chung , Ke Wu

Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In early blockchain protocols, this scarcity was resolved through…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-12-16 Stefanos Leonardos , Daniël Reijsbergen , Barnabé Monnot , Georgios Piliouras

Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party. The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well-designed Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate limited…

General Economics · Economics 2023-05-05 Luyao Zhang , Fan Zhang

Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-12-30 Yotam Gafni

Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive compatible for users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh,…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-12-03 Aadityan Ganesh , Clayton Thomas , S. Matthew Weinberg

A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-03-03 Shoeb Siddiqui , Ganesh Vanahalli , Sujit Gujar

In this paper, we review the undercutting attacks in the transaction-fee-based regime of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains with the longest chain fork-choice rule. Next, we focus on the problem of fluctuations in mining revenue and the mining…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-02-13 Rastislav Budinský , Ivan Homoliak , Ivana Stančíková

The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i)…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2022-03-15 Ron Lavi , Or Sattath , Aviv Zohar