Related papers: Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms
A fundamental question that has been studied in cryptography and in information theory is whether two parties can communicate confidentially using exclusively an open channel. We consider the model in which the two parties hold inputs that…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
It is shown how the evidence state space in quantum bit commitment may be made to depend on the bit value 0 or 1 with split entangled pairs. As a consequence, one can obtain a protocol that is perfectly concealing, but is also…
With the rise of machine learning techniques, ensuring the fairness of decisions made by machine learning algorithms has become of great importance in critical applications. However, measuring fairness often requires full access to the…
Central cryptographic functionalities such as encryption, authentication, or secure two-party computation cannot be realized in an information-theoretically secure way from scratch. This serves as a motivation to study what (possibly weak)…
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are a cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret value to a verifier without revealing anything about the secret itself. ZKPs have shown to be an extremely powerful tool,…
We study the design of mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. While the mechanism designer cannot necessarily commit to a particular social choice function in the face of unawareness, she can at least commit to properties of…
Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her…
We reconsider the concept of multi-prover commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Cr\'{e}peau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies…
In principle, explanations are intended as a way to increase trust in machine learning models and are often obligated by regulations. However, many circumstances where these are demanded are adversarial in nature, meaning the involved…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
We propose an efficient quantum protocol performing quantum bit commitment, which is a simple cryptographic primitive involved with two parties, called a committer and a verifier. Our protocol is non-interactive, uses no supplemental shared…
Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable…
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence…
In many settings -- like market research and social choice -- people may be presented with unfamiliar options. Classical mechanisms may perform poorly because they fail to incentivize people to learn about these options, or worse, encourage…
We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal…
Blind quantum computation protocols allow a user with limited quantum technology to delegate an intractable computation to a quantum server while keeping the computation perfectly secret. Whereas in some protocols a user can verify that…