Related papers: A theoretical basis for MEV
Recently, Decentralized Finance (DeFi) platforms on Ethereum are booming, and numerous traders are trying to capitalize on the opportunity for maximizing their benefits by launching front-running attacks and extracting Miner Extractable…
In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to…
A central question of the Ethereum ecosystem is where Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)revenue originates and to what extent it stems from harming unsuspecting users. It is acceptable if MEV arises from arbitrages between centralised and…
This paper addresses the lack of research on quantifying Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on Ethereum Layer 2 networks (L2s). Our findings reveal a substantial amount of MEV to be extracted on L2s, particularly on Polygon, with a lower bound…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in Constant Function Market Making is fairly well understood. Does having dynamic weights, as found in liquidity boostrap pools (LBPs), Temporal-function market makers (TFMMs), and Replicating market makers…
A growing body of literature is aimed at designing private mempools in blockchains. The ultimate goal of this research is addressing several phenomena broadly classed under MEV with sandwich attacks as the canonical example. The literature…
The emergence of decentralized finance has transformed asset trading on the blockchain, making traditional financial instruments more accessible while also introducing a series of exploitative economic practices known as Maximal Extractable…
Complex DeFi services are usually constructed by composing a variety of simpler smart contracts. The permissionless nature of the blockchains where these smart contracts are executed makes DeFi services exposed to security risks, since…
Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV…
The prevalence of maximal extractable value (MEV) in the Ethereum ecosystem has led to a characterization of the latter as a dark forest. Studies of MEV have thus far largely been restricted to purely on-chain MEV, i.e., sandwich attacks,…
We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…
Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…
Cryptocurrency miners have great latitude in deciding which transactions they accept, including their own, and the order in which they accept them. Ethereum miners in particular use this flexibility to collect MEV-Miner Extractable Value-by…
Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…
With the rapid advancement of blockchain technology, smart contracts have enabled the implementation of increasingly complex functionalities. However, ensuring the security of smart contracts remains a persistent challenge across the stages…
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…
In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at…
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…
The rapid growth of Blockchain and Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has introduced new challenges and vulnerabilities that threaten the integrity and efficiency of the ecosystem. This study identifies critical issues such as Transaction Order…