Related papers: The Attractor of the Replicator Dynamic in Zero-Su…

In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…

There have been extensive studies on learning in zero-sum games, focusing on the analysis of the existence and algorithmic convergence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Existing studies mainly focus on symmetric games where the strategy spaces of…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

We study the convergence properties of a payoff-based higher-order version of replicator dynamics, a widely studied model in evolutionary dynamics and game-theoretic learning, in contractive games. Recent work has introduced a…

This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…

We formulate a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

This paper introduces a nonlinear multi-agent dynamic model that characterizes the resource-seizing mechanism for a fixed amount of resources. The model demonstrates a winners-take-all behavior within a zero-sum game framework. It…

Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a classic non-cooperative game widely studied in terms of its theoretical analysis as well as in its applications, ranging from sociology and biology to economics. Many experimental results of the RPS…

We study a two-player zero-sum game in which the row player aims to maximize their payoff against a competing column player, under an unknown payoff matrix estimated through bandit feedback. We propose three algorithms based on the…

In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

Players are arranged on a regular lattice and coded with a specific strategy for a pre-defined game. Each player sums their payoffs from playing the game with each of their neighbors, and then adopts the strategy of the most successful…

We provide a complete characterization for uniqueness of equilibria in unconstrained polymatrix games. We show that while uniqueness is natural for coordination and general polymatrix games, zero-sum games require that the dimension of the…