Related papers: Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Game…
We revisit the problem of \textit{online linear optimization} in case the set of feasible actions is accessible through an approximated linear optimization oracle with a factor $\alpha$ multiplicative approximation guarantee. This setting…
Regret minimization is a powerful method for finding Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games (NFGs) and Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), but it typically guarantees convergence only for the average strategy. However, computing the average strategy…
We propose the first regret-based approach to the Graphical Bilinear Bandits problem, where $n$ agents in a graph play a stochastic bilinear bandit game with each of their neighbors. This setting reveals a combinatorial NP-hard problem that…
We revisit the problem of online learning with sleeping experts/bandits: in each time step, only a subset of the actions are available for the algorithm to choose from (and learn about). The work of Kleinberg et al. (2010) showed that there…
We propose a novel online learning method for minimizing regret in large extensive-form games. The approach learns a function approximator online to estimate the regret for choosing a particular action. A no-regret algorithm uses these…
By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form…
In online convex optimization, the player aims to minimize regret, or the difference between her loss and that of the best fixed decision in hindsight over the entire repeated game. Algorithms that minimize (standard) regret may converge to…
We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold.…
We consider an online two-stage stochastic optimization with long-term constraints over a finite horizon of $T$ periods. At each period, we take the first-stage action, observe a model parameter realization and then take the second-stage…
The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…
On-policy imitation learning algorithms such as DAgger evolve a robot control policy by executing it, measuring performance (loss), obtaining corrective feedback from a supervisor, and generating the next policy. As the loss between…
The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects…
The Competing Bandits framework is a recently emerging area that integrates multi-armed bandits in online learning with stable matching in game theory. While conventional models assume that all players and arms are constantly available, in…
We study a generalization of the Online Convex Optimization (OCO) framework with time-varying adversarial constraints. In this setting, at each round, the learner selects an action from a convex decision set $X$, after which both a convex…
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form games, the trigger regret of each player grows as $O(\log T)$…
Gradient-variation online learning aims to achieve regret guarantees that scale with variations in the gradients of online functions, which has been shown to be crucial for attaining fast convergence in games and robustness in stochastic…
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a…
We introduce a generalization of zero-sum network multiagent matrix games and prove that alternating gradient descent converges to the set of Nash equilibria at rate $O(1/T)$ for this set of games. Alternating gradient descent obtains this…
We present an algorithm that achieves almost optimal pseudo-regret bounds against adversarial and stochastic bandits. Against adversarial bandits the pseudo-regret is $O(K\sqrt{n \log n})$ and against stochastic bandits the pseudo-regret is…
An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…