Related papers: Tackling Stackelberg Network Interdiction against …
The paper proposes a novel neuroevolutionary method (NESG) for calculating leader's payoff in Stackelberg Security Games. The heart of NESG is strategy evaluation neural network (SENN). SENN is able to effectively evaluate leader's…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the…
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker…
In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the interaction between an adversary and a classifier. There are two classes (i.e., positive and negative classes) to which data points can belong. The adversary is interested in…
In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the…
We study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a…
This paper studies a stochastic robotic surveillance problem where a mobile robot moves randomly on a graph to capture a potential intruder that strategically attacks a location on the graph. The intruder is assumed to be omniscient: it…
The interdiction of escaping adversaries in urban networks is a critical security challenge. State-of-the-art game-theoretic models, such as the Escape Interdiction Game (EIG), provide comprehensive frameworks but assume a highly dynamic…
This work studies a dynamic, adversarial resource allocation problem in environments modeled as graphs. A blue team of defender robots are deployed in the environment to protect the nodes from a red team of attacker robots. We formulate the…
We consider online learning with feedback graphs, a sequential decision-making framework where the learner's feedback is determined by a directed graph over the action set. We present a computationally efficient algorithm for learning in…
We consider two-stage robust optimization problems, which can be seen as games between a decision maker and an adversary. After the decision maker fixes part of the solution, the adversary chooses a scenario from a specified uncertainty…
Stochastic and adversarial data are two widely studied settings in online learning. But many optimization tasks are neither i.i.d. nor fully adversarial, which makes it of fundamental interest to get a better theoretical understanding of…
In many applications, learning systems are required to process continuous non-stationary data streams. We study this problem in an online learning framework and propose an algorithm that can deal with adversarial time-varying and nonlinear…
We propose algorithms to approximate directed information graphs. Directed information graphs are probabilistic graphical models that depict causal dependencies between stochastic processes in a network. The proposed algorithms identify…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
We consider the Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints, an extension of the classic 0-1 knapsack problem formulated as a Stackelberg game with two agents, a leader and a follower, that choose items from a common set and hold their…
We investigate the problem of stabilizing an unknown networked linear system under communication constraints and adversarial disturbances. We propose the first provably stabilizing algorithm for the problem. The algorithm uses a distributed…
We design and analyze minimax-optimal algorithms for online linear optimization games where the player's choice is unconstrained. The player strives to minimize regret, the difference between his loss and the loss of a post-hoc benchmark…