Related papers: Cursed Sequential Equilibrium
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria…
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner's dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
We study how cursedness, the tendency to neglect how other people's strategies depend on their private information, affects information transmission in Spence's job market signaling game. We characterize the Cursed Sequential Equilibrium…
Sequential equilibrium is the conventional approach for analyzing multi-stage games of incomplete information. It relies on mutual consistency of beliefs. To relax mutual consistency, I theoretically and experimentally explore the dynamic…
Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…
Quantum game theory has emerged as a promising candidate to further the understanding of quantum correlations. Motivated by this, it is demonstrated that pure strategy Nash equilibria can be utilised as a mechanism to witness and determine…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
We study the strategic advantages of coarsening one's utility by clustering nearby payoffs together (i.e., classifying them the same way). Our solution concept, coarse-utility equilibrium (CUE) requires that (1) each player maximizes her…
Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to {\em Bayesian} security…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Correlated Equilibrium (CE) is a well-established solution concept that captures coordination among agents and enjoys good algorithmic properties. In real-world multi-agent systems, in addition to being in an equilibrium, agents' policies…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some…
In competitive multi-player interactions, simultaneous optimality is a key requirement for establishing strategic equilibria. This property is explicit when the game-theoretic equilibrium is the simultaneously optimal solution of coupled…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…