Related papers: Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as envy-freeness, which states that no agent should…
The paper considers fair allocation of indivisible nondisposable items that generate disutility (chores). We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent's share has to form a connected subgraph of this…
Relying on configuration spaces and equivariant topology, we study a general "cooperative envy-free division problem". A group of players want to cut a "cake" $I=[0,1]$ and divide among themselves the pieces in an envy-free manner. Once the…
A matching in a bipartite graph with parts X and Y is called envy-free if no unmatched vertex in X is a adjacent to a matched vertex in Y. Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings exist even when perfect matchings do…
We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited number of agents. An agent cares about what resource they get…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
The classical cake cutting problem studies how to find fair allocations of a heterogeneous and divisible resource among multiple agents. Two of the most commonly studied fairness concepts in cake cutting are proportionality and…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as {\em capacitated} and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive…
We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility…
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…
We consider a scheduling problem of strategic agents representing jobs of different weights. Each agent has to decide on one of a finite set of identical machines to get their job processed. In contrast to the common and exclusive focus on…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and $2/3$-MMS allocation can be obtained using the Envy-Cycle-Elimination (ECE) algorithm. In this work,…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic…