Related papers: Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores
Envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of envy-freeness for the case of indivisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents with subadditive valuations. In…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking…
In this paper, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents. The fairness measure we considered here is the maximin share. The previous best known result is that there always exists a…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…
The classic house allocation problem is primarily concerned with finding a matching between a set of agents and a set of houses that guarantees some notion of economic efficiency (e.g. utilitarian welfare). While recent works have shifted…
In fair division of indivisible items, domain restriction has played a key role in escaping from negative results and providing structural insights into the computational and axiomatic boundaries of fairness. One notable subdomain of…
Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if $m$ items are divided among $n$ agents whose utilities are…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
We present a simple local search algorithm for computing EFX (envy-free up to any good) allocations of $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations. EFX is a compelling fairness notion, and whether such allocations always…
Fair allocation of indivisible items among agents is a fundamental and extensively studied problem. However, fairness does not have a single universally accepted definition, leading to a variety of competing fairness notions. Some of these…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
The problem of finding envy-free allocations of indivisible goods can not always be solved; therefore, it is common to study some relaxations such as envy-free up to one good (EF1). Another property of interest for efficiency of an…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open…
We study the computational complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium (CE) with chores when agents have linear preferences. CE is one of the most preferred mechanisms for allocating a set of items among agents. CE with equal incomes…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want…
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemaitre (2014) presented a hierarchy of fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects. Among them CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) was the strongest. In this note, we settle the…