Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes for Allocation of Indivisible Objects
Computer Science and Game Theory
2015-05-21 v2
Abstract
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemaitre (2014) presented a hierarchy of fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects. Among them CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) was the strongest. In this note, we settle the complexity of computing a discrete CEEI assignment by showing it is strongly NP-hard. We then highlight a fairness notion (CEEI-FRAC) that is even stronger than CEEI for discrete assignments, is always Pareto optimal, and can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that computing a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment is strongly NP-hard in general but polynomial-time computable if the utilities are zero or one.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1501.06627,
title = {Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes for Allocation of Indivisible Objects},
author = {Haris Aziz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1501.06627},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
6 pages