Related papers: Efficiency in Collective Decision-Making via Quadr…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
We discuss the collective behavior of a network of individuals that receive, process and forward to each other tasks. Given costs they store those tasks in buffers, choosing optimally the frequency at which to check and process the buffer.…
The central result of this paper is the analysis of an optimization problem which allows one to assess the limiting performance of a team of two agents who coordinate their actions. One agent is fully informed about the past and future…
We consider cooperative multi-agent consensus optimization problems over an undirected network of agents, where only those agents connected by an edge can directly communicate. The objective is to minimize the sum of agent-specific…
This paper focuses on a decentralized profit-center firm that uses negotiated transfer pricing as an instrument to coordinate the production process. Moreover, the firm's headquarters gives its divisions full authority over operating…
We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this…
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…
We propose a simple model that describes the dynamics of efficiencies of competing agents. Agents communicate leading to increase of efficiencies of underachievers, and an efficiency of each agent can increase or decrease irrespectively of…
Voting mechanisms are widely accepted and used methods for decentralized decision-making. Ensuring the acceptance of the voting mechanism's outcome is a crucial characteristic of robust voting systems. Consider this scenario: A group of…
This essay discusses the advantages of a probabilistic agent-based approach to questions in theoretical economics, from the nature of economic agents, to the nature of the equilibria supported by their interactions. One idea we propose is…
In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
Given a random variable $O \in \mathbb{R}$ and a set of experts $E$, we describe a method for finding a subset of experts $S \subseteq E$ whose aggregated opinion best predicts the outcome of $O$. Therefore, the problem can be regarded as a…
This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented unless…
We propose a new approach for solving a class of discrete decision making problems under uncertainty with positive cost. This issue concerns multiple and diverse fields such as engineering, economics, artificial intelligence, cognitive…
Multi agent consensus algorithms with update steps based on so-called balanced asymmetric chains, are analyzed. For such algorithms it is shown that (i) the set of accumulation points of states is finite, (ii) the asymptotic unconditional…
We study whether a social planner can improve the efficiency of learning, measured by the expected total welfare loss, in a sequential decision-making environment. Agents arrive in order and each makes a binary action based on their private…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
In this paper, we consider linear quadratic team problems with an arbitrary number of quadratic constraints in both stochastic and deterministic settings. The team consists of players with different measurements about the state of nature.…