Related papers: Efficiency in Collective Decision-Making via Quadr…

We propose two distributed iterative algorithms that can be used to solve, in finite time, the distributed optimization problem over quadratic local cost functions in large-scale networks. The first algorithm exhibits synchronous operation…

We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…

We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…

We study the problem of distributed cooperative learning, where a group of agents seeks to agree on a set of hypotheses that best describes a sequence of private observations. In the scenario where the set of hypotheses is large, we propose…

The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…

Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…

Quantum correlations provide dramatic advantage over the corresponding classical resources in several communication tasks. However a broad class of probabilistic theories exists that attributes greater success than quantum theory in many of…

An agent choosing between various actions tends to take the one with the lowest cost. But this choice is arguably too rigid (not adaptive) to be useful in complex situations, e.g., where exploration-exploitation trade-off is relevant in…

A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…

In this paper, we address two forms of consensus for multi-agent systems with undirected, signed, weighted, and connected communication graphs, under the assumption that the agents can be partitioned into three clusters, representing the…

We show that in a variant of the Minority Game problem, the agents can reach a state of maximum social efficiency, where the fluctuation between the two choices is minimum, by following a simple stochastic strategy. By imagining a social…

This paper studies the correlations of the average winnings of agents and the volatilities of systems based on mix-game model which is an extension of minority game (MG). In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the…

The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from…

Much of the success of multi-agent debates depends on carefully choosing the right parameters. The decision-making protocol stands out as it can highly impact final model answers, depending on how decisions are reached. Systematic…

We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…

While sequential task assignment for a single agent has been widely studied, such problems in a multi-agent setting, where the agents have heterogeneous task preferences or capabilities, remain less well-characterized. We study a…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…

This paper addresses the adaptive consensus problem in uncertain multi-agent systems, particularly under challenges posed by quantized communication. We consider agents with general linear dynamics subject to nonlinear uncertainties and…

In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…