Related papers: Cooperative Concurrent Games
We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
This work studies the problem of ad hoc teamwork in teams composed of agents with differing computational capabilities. We consider cooperative multi-player games in which each agent's policy is constrained by a private capability…
Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
Automated testing of computer games is a challenging problem, especially when lengthy scenarios have to be tested. Automating such a scenario boils down to finding the right sequence of interactions given an abstract description of the…
Multiagent systems can use commitments as the core of a general coordination infrastructure, supporting both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions. Agents whose objectives are aligned, and where one agent can help another achieve…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
Most work on the verification of concurrent objects for shared memory assumes sequential consistency, but most multicore processors support only weak memory models that do not provide sequential consistency. Furthermore, most verification…
We describe the design and implementation of a reasoning engine that facilitates the gamification of loop-invariant discovery. Our reasoning engine enables students, computational agents and regular software engineers with no formal methods…
Formal verification guarantees proof validity but not formalization faithfulness. For natural-language logical reasoning, where models construct axiom systems from scratch without library constraints, this gap between valid proofs and…
Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games…
Securing coordination between AI agent and teammates (human players or AI agents) in contexts involving unfamiliar humans continues to pose a significant challenge in Zero-Shot Coordination. The issue of cooperative incompatibility becomes…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
This paper presents a {theoretical study} of the problem of verifying linearizability at runtime, where one seeks for a concurrent algorithm for verifying that the current execution of a given concurrent shared object implementation is…
LP-duality theory has played a central role in the study of the core, right from its early days to the present time. However, despite the extensive nature of this work, basic gaps still remain. We address these gaps using the following…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent…
Stochastic games are a convenient formalism for modelling systems that comprise rational agents competing or collaborating within uncertain environments. Probabilistic model checking techniques for this class of models allow us to formally…