Related papers: Altruism in Coalition Formation Games
Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…
Hedonic games are fundamental models for investigating the formation of coalitions among a set of strategic agents, where every agent has a certain utility for every possible coalition of agents it can be part of. To avoid the…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the…
We consider a class of coalition formation games called hedonic games, i.e., games in which the utility of a player is completely determined by the coalition that the player belongs to. We first define the class of subset-additive hedonic…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
This paper considers the problem of dividing agents among coalitions. We concentrate on Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHG's), in which each agent has a non-negative value for every other agent and her utility is the sum of the values…
We initiate the study of control in hedonic games, where an external actor influences coalition formation by adding or deleting agents. We consider three basic control goals (1) enforcing that an agent is not alone (NA); (2) enforcing that…
Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed…
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in…
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where…
Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition…
Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked…
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the…
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…