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In this paper, we study a class of two-player deterministic finite-horizon difference games with coupled inequality constraints, where each player has two types of decision variables: one involving sequential interactions and the other…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is often modeled using the framework of Markov games (also called stochastic games or dynamic games). Most of the existing literature on MARL concentrates on zero-sum Markov games but is not…
Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
Almost all of the work in graphical models for game theory has mirrored previous work in probabilistic graphical models. Our work considers the opposite direction: Taking advantage of recent advances in equilibrium computation for…
This paper studies the mean field game (MFG) problem arising from a large population competition in fund management, featuring a new type of relative performance via the benchmark tracking. In the $n$-player model, each agent aims to…
Valuation problems, such as feature interpretation, data valuation and model valuation for ensembles, become increasingly more important in many machine learning applications. Such problems are commonly solved by well-known game-theoretic…
This paper investigates open-loop and feedback solutions of linear quadratic mean field (MF) games with a leader and a large number of followers. The leader first gives its strategy and then all the followers cooperate to optimize the…
The double oracle algorithm is a popular method of solving games, because it is able to reduce computing equilibria to computing a series of best responses. However, its theoretical properties are not well understood. In this paper, we…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
We investigate the resolution of second-order, potential, and monotone mean field games with the generalized conditional gradient algorithm, an extension of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We show that the method is equivalent to the fictitious…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. In this paper, we study the expected value of bounded quantitative prefix-independent objectives in the context of stochastic games. We…
The study of learning in games has thus far focused primarily on normal form games. In contrast, our understanding of learning in extensive form games (EFGs) and particularly in EFGs with many agents lags far behind, despite them being…
We propose a novel online learning method for minimizing regret in large extensive-form games. The approach learns a function approximator online to estimate the regret for choosing a particular action. A no-regret algorithm uses these…
We consider learning approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time mean-field games with nonlinear stochastic state dynamics subject to both average and discounted costs. To this end, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator,…
The efficient frontier (EF) is a fundamental resource allocation problem where one has to find an optimal portfolio maximizing a reward at a given level of risk. This optimal solution is traditionally found by solving a convex optimization…
Fictitious Play (FP) is a simple and natural dynamic for repeated play with many applications in game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. It was introduced by Brown (1949,1951) and its convergence properties for two-player…
The paper is concerned with distributed learning and optimization in large-scale settings. The well-known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm has been shown to achieve Nash equilibrium learning in certain classes of multi-agent games. However,…
Mean Field Control Games (MFCGs) provide a powerful theoretical framework for analyzing systems of infinitely many interacting agents, blending elements from Mean Field Games (MFGs) and Mean Field Control (MFC). However, solving the coupled…
Fictitious play (FP) is a history-based strategy to choose actions in normal-form games, where players best-respond to the empirical frequency of their opponents' past actions. While it is well-established that FP converges to the set of…