Related papers: Equilibria in Repeated Games under No-Regret with …
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in Cournot games with continuous actions. Cournot games are the essential model for many socio-economic systems, where players compete by strategically setting their output quantity.…
Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…
This paper introduces a sampling-based strategy synthesis algorithm for nondeterministic hybrid systems with complex continuous dynamics under temporal and reachability constraints. We model the evolution of the hybrid system as a…
We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…
No-regret learning dynamics ensure that a learner asymptotically achieves an average reward no worse than that of any fixed strategy. This no-regret guarantee does not determine the value of the asymptotic average reward. Indeed, it is…
This paper addresses the estimation of a time- varying parameter in a network. A group of agents sequentially receive noisy signals about the parameter (or moving target), which does not follow any particular dynamics. The parameter is not…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
In adversarial multi-armed bandits, two performance measures are commonly used: static regret, which compares the learner to the best fixed arm, and dynamic regret, which compares it to the best sequence of arms. While optimal algorithms…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
This article extends the idea of solving parity games by strategy iteration to non-deterministic strategies: In a non-deterministic strategy a player restricts himself to some non-empty subset of possible actions at a given node, instead of…
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms,…
This work tackles the complexities of multi-player scenarios in \emph{unknown games}, where the primary challenge lies in navigating the uncertainty of the environment through bandit feedback alongside strategic decision-making. We…
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
Robust self-testing in non-local games allows a classical referee to certify that two untrustworthy players are able to perform a specific quantum strategy up to high precision. Proving robust self-testing results becomes significantly…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…