Related papers: Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation
In this article, we study feature attributions of Machine Learning (ML) models originating from linear game values and coalitional values defined as operators on appropriate functional spaces. The main focus is on random games based on the…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
Static stability in economic models means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…
Opinion dynamics of random-walking agents on finite two-dimensional lattices is studied. In the model, the opinion is continuous, and both the lattice and the opinion can be either periodic or non-periodic. At each time step, all agents…
Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We consider a population of agents competing for finite resources using strategies based on two channels of signals. The model is applicable to financial markets, ecosystems and computer networks. We find that the dynamics of the system is…
We study the problem of resilient strategies in the presence of uncertainty. Resilient strategies enable an agent to make decisions that are robust against disturbances. In particular, we are interested in those disturbances that are able…
Coalition formation is often modeled as a static equilibrium problem, neglecting the dynamic processes governing how agents self-organize. This paper proposes a dynamic split-and-merge framework that balances two conflicting economic…
The system of N particles moving on a circle and interacting via a global repulsive cosine interaction is well known to display spatially inhomogeneous structures of extraordinary stability starting from certain low energy initial…
We study the multi-scale description of large-time collective behavior of agents driven by alignment. The resulting multi-flock dynamics arises naturally with realistic initial configurations consisting of multiple spatial scaling, which in…
Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this…
A population of heterogenous agents compeeting through a minority rule is investigated. Agents which frequently loose are selected for evolution by changing their strategies. The stationary composition of the population resulting for this…
In this work we present a strategic network formation model predicting the emergence of multigroup structures. Individuals decide to form or remove links based on the benefits and costs those connections carry; we focus on bilateral consent…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
The Minority Game framework was recently generalized to account for the possibility that agents adapt not only through strategy selection but also by diversifying their response according to the kind of dynamical regime, or the risk, they…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…