Related papers: When Congestion Games Meet Mobile Crowdsourcing: S…
Within mobility systems, the presence of self-interested users can lead to aggregate routing patterns that are far from the societal optimum which could be achieved by centrally controlling the users' choices. In this paper, we design a…
We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…
Itinerary recommendation is a complex sequence prediction problem with numerous real-world applications. This task becomes even more challenging when considering the optimization of multiple user queuing times and crowd levels, as well as…
In autonomous mobility-on-demand systems, effectively managing vehicle flows to mitigate induced congestion and ensure efficient operations is imperative for system performance and positive customer experience. Against this background, we…
We study a crowdsourcing problem where the platform aims to incentivize distributed workers to provide high quality and truthful solutions without the ability to verify the solutions. While most prior work assumes that the platform and…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
The design of integrated mobility-on-demand services requires jointly considering the interactions between traveler choice behavior and operators' operation policies to design a financially sustainable pricing scheme. However, most existing…
A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized,…
Traditional selfish routing literature quantifies inefficiency in transportation systems with single-attribute costs using price-of-anarchy (PoA), and provides various technical approaches (e.g. marginal cost pricing) to improve PoA of the…
We design efficient online scheduling policies to maximize the freshness of information delivered to the users in a cellular network under both adversarial and stochastic channel and mobility assumptions. The information freshness achieved…
We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
Consider a network design application where we wish to lay down a minimum-cost spanning tree in a given graph; however, we only have stochastic information about the edge costs. To learn the precise cost of any edge, we have to conduct a…
Collaborative vehicle routing occurs when carriers collaborate through sharing their transportation requests and performing transportation requests on behalf of each other. This achieves economies of scale, thus reducing cost, greenhouse…
Recent advances in wireless technologies have enabled many new applications in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) such as collision avoidance, cooperative driving, congestion avoidance, and traffic optimization. Due to the vulnerable…
Imposing fairness in resource allocation incurs a loss of system throughput, known as the Price of Fairness ($PoF$). In wireless scheduling, $PoF$ increases when serving users with very poor channel quality because the scheduler wastes…
This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might…