Related papers: Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods
Approval-Based Committee (ABC) rules are an important tool for choosing a fair set of candidates when given the preferences of a collection of voters. Though finding a winning committee for many ABC rules is NP-hard, natural variations for…
Consider designing an effective crowdsourcing system for an $M$-ary classification task. Crowd workers complete simple binary microtasks whose results are aggregated to give the final result. We consider the novel scenario where workers…
In an indivisible participatory budgeting (PB) framework, we have a limited budget that is to be distributed among a set of projects, by aggregating the preferences of voters for the projects. All the prior work on indivisible PB assumes…
We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…
Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) enhances the reasoning of large language models (LLMs), but standard RLVR often depends on human-annotated answers or carefully curated reward specifications. In machine-checkable…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
Several phenomena are available representing market activity: volumes, number of trades, durations between trades or quotes, volatility - however measured - all share the feature to be represented as positive valued time series. When…
We consider fair allocations of indivisible goods to agents with general monotone valuations. We observe that it is useful to introduce a new share-based fairness notion, the {\em residual maximin share} (RMMS). This share is {\em feasible}…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
This work proposes a learning method to accelerate robotic pick-and-place planning by predicting shared grasps. Shared grasps are defined as grasp poses feasible to both the initial and goal object configurations in a pick-and-place task.…
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity…
We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to select $k \leq m$ goods in a fair and efficient manner. We first…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…
We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that,…