Related papers: Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer

We experimentally demonstrate a new widespread read disturbance phenomenon, ColumnDisturb, in real commodity DRAM chips. By repeatedly opening or keeping a DRAM row (aggressor row) open, we show that it is possible to disturb DRAM cells…

Today's systems have diverse needs that are difficult to address using one-size-fits-all commodity DRAM. Unfortunately, although system designers can theoretically adapt commodity DRAM chips to meet their particular design goals (e.g., by…

In recent years, Rowhammer has attracted significant attention from academia and industry alike. This technique, first published in 2014, flips bits in memory by repeatedly accessing neighbouring memory locations. Since its discovery,…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that a memory location can only be modified by processes that may write to this memory location. However, a recent study has shown that parasitic effects in DRAM can change the content of a…

After a plethora of high-profile RowHammer attacks, CPU and DRAM vendors scrambled to deliver what was meant to be the definitive hardware solution against the RowHammer problem: Target Row Refresh (TRR). A common belief among practitioners…

Modern architecture research relies on simulators to evaluate system security, yet analyzing emerging hardware vulnerabilities like RowHammer requires full-system visibility. As RowHammer vulnerabilities worsen with continuous technology…

In the past decade, many vulnerabilities were discovered in microarchitectures which yielded attack vectors and motivated the study of countermeasures. Further, architectural and physical imperfections in DRAMs led to the discovery of…

Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is a promising paradigm for alleviating the data movement bottleneck using DRAM's massive internal parallelism and bandwidth to execute very wide operations. Performing a PuD operation involves activating…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does not hold if the attacker has physical access.…

Modern DRAM chips are subject to read disturbance errors. State-of-the-art read disturbance mitigations rely on accurate and exhaustive characterization of the read disturbance threshold (RDT) (e.g., the number of aggressor row activations…

The Rowhammer vulnerability poses an increasing challenge with newer generations of DRAM and aggressive technology scaling. Existing mitigation techniques, such as Graphene, Twice, and Hydra, primarily rely on tracking activation counts for…

The demand for precise information on DRAM microarchitectures and error characteristics has surged, driven by the need to explore processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate security vulnerability. Nonetheless, DRAM…

Generational improvements to commodity DRAM throughout half a century have long solidified its prevalence as main memory across the computing industry. However, overcoming today's DRAM technology scaling challenges requires new solutions…

Security of machine learning is increasingly becoming a major concern due to the ubiquitous deployment of deep learning in many security-sensitive domains. Many prior studies have shown external attacks such as adversarial examples that…

Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer unique advantages in energy efficiency, latency, and features such as computing-in-memory. Consequently, emerging NVM technologies are considered an ideal substrate for computation and…

With lowering thresholds, transparently defending against Rowhammer within DRAM is challenging due to the lack of time to perform mitigation. Commercially deployed in-DRAM defenses like TRR that steal time from normal refreshes~(REF) to…

Rowhammer has drawn much attention from both academia and industry in the past years as rowhammer exploitation poses severe consequences to system security. Since the first comprehensive study of rowhammer in 2014, a number of rowhammer…

We experimentally demonstrate the effects of read disturbance (RowHammer and RowPress) and uncover the inner workings of undocumented read disturbance defense mechanisms in High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). Detailed characterization of six real…

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is the prevalent memory technology used to build main memory systems of almost all computers. A fundamental shortcoming of DRAM is the need to refresh memory cells to keep stored data intact. DRAM refresh…

DRAM cells are susceptible to Data-Disturbance Errors (DDE), which can be exploited by an attacker to compromise system security. Rowhammer is a well-known DDE vulnerability that occurs when a row is repeatedly activated. Rowhammer can be…