Related papers: Firm-worker hypergraphs
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
We construct a data-driven model of flows in graphs that captures the essential elements of the movement of workers between jobs in the companies (firms) of entire economic systems such as countries. The model is based on the observation…
For a flexible labeling of a graph, it is possible to construct infinitely many non-equivalent realizations keeping the distances of connected points constant. We give a combinatorial characterization of graphs that have flexible labelings.…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent…
In this paper we develop a framework to study observability for uniform hypergraphs. Hypergraphs, being extensions of graphs, allow edges to connect multiple nodes and unambiguously represent multi-way relationships which are ubiquitous in…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We develop an alternative theory to the aggregate matching function in which workers search for jobs through a network of firms: the labor flow network. The lack of an edge between two companies indicates the impossibility of labor flows…
In this paper we consider aspects of geometric observability for hypergraphs, extending our earlier work from the uniform to the nonuniform case. Hypergraphs, a generalization of graphs, allow hyperedges to connect multiple nodes and…
The acknowledged model for networks of collaborations is the hypergraph model. Nonetheless when it comes to be visualized hypergraphs are transformed into simple graphs. Very often, the transformation is made by clique expansion of the…
We investigate properties which ensure that a given finite graph is the commuting graph of a group or semigroup. We show that all graphs on at least two vertices such that no vertex is adjacent to all other vertices is the commuting graph…
Hypergraphs are a generalization of graphs in which edges can connect any number of vertices. They allow the modeling of complex networks with higher-order interactions, and their spectral theory studies the qualitative properties that can…
Recently, it has been shown that networks with an arbitrary degree sequence may be a stable solution to a network formation game. Further, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of firms participating in collaborative efforts.…
Networks are a widely used and efficient paradigm to model real-world systems where basic units interact pairwise. Many body interactions are often at play, and cannot be modelled by resorting to binary exchanges. In this work, we consider…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
In discrete matching markets, substitutes and complements can be unidirectional between two groups of workers when members of one group are more important or competent than those of the other group for firms. We show that a stable matching…