Related papers: Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point …
We study fairness-accuracy tradeoffs when a single predictive model must serve multiple demographic groups. A useful tool for understanding this tradeoff is the fairness-accuracy (FA) Pareto frontier, which characterizes the set of models…
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Differential privacy is a mathematical framework for privacy-preserving data analysis. Changing the hyperparameters of a differentially private algorithm allows one to trade off privacy and utility in a principled way. Quantifying this…
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet consistency, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower…
Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…
The optimal quantum measurements for estimating individual parameters might be incompatible with each other so that they cannot be jointly performed. The tradeoff between the estimation precision for different parameters can be…
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it…
Markets increasingly accommodate large language models (LLMs) as autonomous decision-making agents. As this transition occurs, it becomes critical to evaluate how these agents behave relative to their human and task-specific statistical…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…
Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committed demands are incompatible, then the current-period surplus…
Deploying machine learning (ML) models often requires both fairness and privacy guarantees. Both of these objectives present unique trade-offs with the utility (e.g., accuracy) of the model. However, the mutual interactions between…
Reviewers in peer review are often miscalibrated: they may be strict, lenient, extreme, moderate, etc. A number of algorithms have previously been proposed to calibrate reviews. Such attempts of calibration can however leak sensitive…
We solve the two-player bargaining problem employing Weber's law in psychophysics, which is applied to the perception of utility changes. Using this law, the players define the jointly acceptable range of utilities on the Pareto line, which…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the…
We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…