Related papers: Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point …

Designing fair algorithmic decision systems requires balancing model performance with fairness toward affected individuals: More fairness might require sacrificing some performance and vice versa, yet the space of possible trade-offs is…

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…

Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…

Two-person bargaining problem is considered as to allocate a number of goods between two players. This paper suggests that any non-trivial division of goods cause a non-zero change on the solution of bargaining. So, a axiom of sharing…

In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map from…

Applications of machine learning inform human decision makers in a broad range of tasks. The resulting problem is usually formulated in terms of a single decision maker. We argue that it should rather be described as a two-player learning…

This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which…

Differential privacy (DP) is the standard for privacy-preserving analysis, and introduces a fundamental trade-off between privacy guarantees and model performance. Selecting the optimal balance is a critical challenge that can be framed as…

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…

When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…

We study the Pareto frontier (optimal trade-off) between utility and separation, a fairness criterion requiring predictive independence from sensitive attributes conditional on the true outcome. Through an information-theoretic lens, we…

While the accuracy-fairness trade-off has been frequently observed in the literature of fair machine learning, rigorous theoretical analyses have been scarce. To demystify this long-standing challenge, this work seeks to develop a…

We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to…

This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…

Suppose agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for each other. At each possible outcome, a weighted, directed network describing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes…

An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…

We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and have preferences over the goods of others, but may not use money…

This paper analyzes repeated version of the bilateral trade model where the independent payoff relevant private information of the buyer and the seller is correlated across time. Using this setup it makes the following five contributions.…

We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…

The paper considers the problem of multi-objective decision support when outcomes are uncertain. We extend the concept of Pareto-efficient decisions to take into account the uncertainty of decision outcomes across varying contexts. This…