Related papers: Coordination through ambiguous language
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
Achieving seamless coordination in cooperative games is a crucial challenge in artificial intelligence, particularly when players operate under incomplete information. While communication helps, it is not always feasible. In this paper, we…
In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…
We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players' private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
We study a game for recognising formal languages, in which two players with imperfect information need to coordinate on a common decision, given private input words correlated by a finite graph. The players have a joint objective to avoid…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
Markov games with coupling constraints model constrained dynamical decision-making involving self-interested agents, where the feasibility of an individual agent's strategy depends on the joint strategies of the others. Such games arise in…
LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
The main approach to evaluating communication is by assessing how well it facilitates coordination. If two or more individuals can coordinate through communication, it is generally assumed that they understand one another. We investigate…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have not only showcased impressive creative capabilities but also revealed emerging agentic behaviors that exploit linguistic ambiguity in adversarial settings. In this study, we…
This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…
Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team of agents faces an opponent in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Team members can…