Related papers: Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Ag…
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…
In the online metric bipartite matching problem, we are given a set $S$ of server locations in a metric space. Requests arrive one at a time, and on its arrival, we need to immediately and irrevocably match it to a server at a cost which is…
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…
Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We study a weighted online bipartite matching problem: $G(V_1, V_2, E)$ is a weighted bipartite graph where $V_1$ is known beforehand and the vertices of $V_2$ arrive online. The goal is to match vertices of $V_2$ as they arrive to vertices…
Online bipartite matching with one-sided arrival and its variants have been extensively studied since the seminal work of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (STOC 1990). Motivated by real-life applications with dynamic market structures, e.g.…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
We study the $b$-matching problem in bipartite graphs $G=(S,R,E)$. Each vertex $s\in S$ is a server with individual capacity $b_s$. The vertices $r\in R$ are requests that arrive online and must be assigned instantly to an eligible server.…
We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\em lower}-bounds…
A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with $m$ items achieve approximation guarantees of $O((\log \log m)^3)$ [Assadi and Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard…
Today's online platforms heavily lean on algorithmic recommendations for bolstering user engagement and driving revenue. However, these recommendations can impact multiple stakeholders simultaneously -- the platform, items (sellers), and…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
We study the greedy-based online algorithm for edge-weighted matching with (one-sided) vertex arrivals in bipartite graphs, and edge arrivals in general graphs. This algorithm was first studied more than a decade ago by Korula and P\'al for…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
The online matching problem was introduced by Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani nearly three decades ago. In that seminal work, they studied this problem in bipartite graphs with vertices arriving only on one side, and presented optimal…