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We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative.…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
We investigate the increasingly important and common game-solving setting where we do not have an explicit description of the game but only oracle access to it through gameplay, such as in financial or military simulations and computer…
The double oracle algorithm is a popular method of solving games, because it is able to reduce computing equilibria to computing a series of best responses. However, its theoretical properties are not well understood. In this paper, we…
Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…
Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces,…
This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…
We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient approximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…
We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…
We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a multi-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group. We will show the following results. 1. The…
We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the "imitation of success". In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the…
Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…
This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…