Related papers: Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Dee…

Ensuring safety in MARL, particularly when deploying it in real-world applications such as autonomous driving, emerges as a critical challenge. To address this challenge, traditional safe MARL methods extend MARL approaches to incorporate…

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…

This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

Reinforcement learning (RL) solves sequential decision-making problems via a trial-and-error process interacting with the environment. While RL achieves outstanding success in playing complex video games that allow huge trial-and-error,…

Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has achieved great success in solving complicated decision-making problems. Despite the successes, DRL is frequently criticized for many reasons, e.g., data inefficient, inflexible and intractable reward…

Meta reinforcement learning (RL) attempts to discover new RL algorithms automatically from environment interaction. In so-called black-box approaches, the policy and the learning algorithm are jointly represented by a single neural network.…

Q-learning methods represent a commonly used class of algorithms in reinforcement learning: they are generally efficient and simple, and can be combined readily with function approximators for deep reinforcement learning (RL). However, the…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…

Meta reinforcement learning (meta RL), as a combination of meta-learning ideas and reinforcement learning (RL), enables the agent to adapt to different tasks using a few samples. However, this sampling-based adaptation also makes meta RL…

This paper aims to balance performance and cost in a two-hop wireless cooperative communication network where the source and relays have contradictory optimization goals and make decisions in a distributed manner. This differs from most…

Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a learning paradigm concerned with learning to control a system so as to maximize an objective over the long term. This approach to learning has received immense interest in recent times and success manifests…

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is a very active research area. However, several technical and scientific issues require to be addressed, amongst which we can mention data inefficiency, exploration-exploitation trade-off, and multi-task…

Mean field games (MFGs) have emerged as a powerful framework for modeling interactions in large-scale multi-agent systems. Despite recent advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) for MFGs, existing methods are typically limited to finite…

Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) is remarkably effective in addressing sequential resource allocation problems in domains such as healthcare, public policy, and resource management. However, deep RL policies often lack transparency and…

In this work, we propose the first fully first-order method to compute an epsilon stationary Stackelberg equilibrium with convergence guarantees. To achieve this, we first reframe the leader follower interaction as single level constrained…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

Resource balancing within complex transportation networks is one of the most important problems in real logistics domain. Traditional solutions on these problems leverage combinatorial optimization with demand and supply forecasting.…

We propose a novel approach to address one aspect of the non-stationarity problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL), where the other agents may alter their policies due to environment changes during execution. This violates the…