Related papers: Online Algorithms for the Santa Claus Problem
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…
This paper studies an online trading variant of the classical secretary problem, called secretary problem variant trading (SPVT), from the perspective of an intermediary who facilitates trade between a seller and $n$ buyers (collectively…
We study an online fair division problem where a fixed number of goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated to a given set of agents. Once a good arrives, its true value for each agent is revealed, and it has to be immediately and…
The value maximization version of the secretary problem is the problem of hiring a candidate with the largest value from a randomly ordered sequence of candidates. In this work, we consider a setting where predictions of candidate values…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
We investigate the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ sequentially arriving agents with additive valuations, under the sought-after fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). We first observe a strong impossibility:…
In the prophet inequality problem, a gambler faces a sequence of items arriving online with values drawn independently from known distributions. On seeing an item, the gambler must choose whether to accept its value as her reward and quit…
Coalition formation explores how to partition a set of $n$ agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with an additively separable aggregation of preferences and study the online…
A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…
We study the problem of allocating $T$ sequentially arriving items among $n$ homogeneous agents under the constraint that each agent must receive a pre-specified fraction of all items, with the objective of maximizing the agents' total…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…
The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bound the query complexity of computing an envy-free outcome in…
This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to improve online decisions) - in the context of a simple online…
We consider ordinal online problems, i.e., tasks that only require pairwise comparisons between elements of the input. A classic example is the secretary problem and the game of googol, as well as its multiple combinatorial extensions such…
In the best choice problem with random arrivals, an unknown number $n$ of rankable items arrive at times sampled from the uniform distribution. As is well known, a real-time player can ensure stopping at the overall best item with…
For online resource allocation problems, we propose a new demand arrival model where the sequence of arrivals contains both an adversarial component and a stochastic one. Our model requires no demand forecasting; however, due to the…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We solve the secretary problem in the case that the ranked items arrive in a statistically biased order rather than in uniformly random order. The bias is given by a Mallows distribution with parameter $q\in(0,1)$, so that higher ranked…