Related papers: General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Mode…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
According to Aumann's celebrated theorem, rational agents cannot agree to disagree. In other words, agents who once shared a common prior probability distribution and who have common knowledge about their posteriors cannot assign different…
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show that the direct generalization of the usual agents' profit does not fit some…
We formulate and prove an Agreement Theorem for quantum mechanics (QM), describing when two agents, represented by separate laboratories, can or cannot maintain differing probability estimates of a shared quantum property of interest.…
There is a widespread recent interest in using ideas from statistical physics to model certain types of problems in economics and finance. The main idea is to derive the macroscopic behavior of the market from the random local interactions…
We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
When a collective decision maker presents a menu of uncertain prospects to her group members, each member's choice depends on their predictions about payoff-relevant states. In reality, however, these members hold different predictions;…
The minority model was introduced to study the competition between agents with limited information. It has the remarkable feature that, as the amount of information available increases, the collective gain made by the agents is reduced.…
A new theorem on conditions for convergence to consensus of a multiagent time-dependent time-discrete dynamical system is presented. The theorem is build up on the notion of averaging maps. We compare this theorem to results by Moreau (IEEE…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…
The main theorem of this paper establishes conditions under which the "chaos game" algorithm almost surely yields the attractor of an iterated function system. The theorem holds in a very general setting, even for non contractive iterated…
The problem of demand inversion - a crucial step in the estimation of random utility discrete-choice models - is equivalent to the determination of stable outcomes in two-sided matching models. This equivalence applies to random utility…
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this…
A group of individuals wishes to classify $m$ objects into $n$ categories in such a way that no class is left empty, a condition known as surjectivity. The opinions of the individuals are aggregated separately for each object using an…