Related papers: Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuat…
It is generally believed that submodular functions -- and the more general class of $\gamma$-weakly submodular functions -- may only be optimized under the non-negativity assumption $f(S) \geq 0$. In this paper, we show that once the…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by…
Non-monotone constrained submodular maximization plays a crucial role in various machine learning applications. However, existing algorithms often struggle with a trade-off between approximation guarantees and practical efficiency. The…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
Submodular functions are a fundamental object of study in combinatorial optimization, economics, machine learning, etc. and exhibit a rich combinatorial structure. Many subclasses of submodular functions have also been well studied and…
We propose a new concept named adaptive submodularity ratio to study the greedy policy for sequential decision making. While the greedy policy is known to perform well for a wide variety of adaptive stochastic optimization problems in…
This paper presents a polynomial-time $1/2$-approximation algorithm for maximizing nonnegative $k$-submodular functions. This improves upon the previous $\max\{1/3, 1/(1+a)\}$-approximation by Ward and \v{Z}ivn\'y~(SODA'14), where…
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible goods among $n$ agents, where each agent's valuation is fractionally subadditive (XOS). With respect to AnyPrice Share (APS) fairness, Kulkarni et al. (2024) showed that, when agents have…
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes" condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate…
We consider fairness in submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint, a fundamental problem with various applications in economics, machine learning, and data mining. In the model, we are given a set of ground elements, each…
In this work, we consider the maximization of submodular functions constrained by independence systems. Because of the wide applicability of submodular functions, this problem has been extensively studied in the literature, on specialized…
In fair division of indivisible goods, $\ell$-out-of-$d$ maximin share (MMS) is the value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning the goods into $d$ bundles and choosing the $\ell$ least preferred bundles. Most existing works aim to…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
We study the two-agent single-item bilateral trade. Ideally, the trade should happen whenever the buyer's value for the item exceeds the seller's cost. However, the classical result of Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can…
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as…