Related papers: Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuat…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
We study the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a matroid independence constraint. For more than a decade, a rich body of work has studied this problem. Initially, a tight approximation of $ (1-\frac{1}{e})$ was…
In this work, we establish a novel theoretical connection between supervised fine-tuning and offline reinforcement learning under the token-level Markov decision process, revealing that large language models indeed learn an implicit…
We introduce the problem of maximizing approximately $k$-submodular functions subject to size constraints. In this problem, one seeks to select $k$-disjoint subsets of a ground set with bounded total size or individual sizes, and maximum…
In this work we give two new algorithms that use similar techniques for (non-monotone) submodular function maximization subject to a cardinality constraint. The first is an offline fixed parameter tractable algorithm that guarantees a…
The problem of monotone submodular maximization has been studied extensively due to its wide range of applications. However, there are cases where one can only access the objective function in a distorted or noisy form because of the…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with submodular valuation functions, where agents may have either equal entitlements or arbitrary (possibly unequal) entitlements. We focus on share-based fairness…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…
Most work in algorithmic fairness to date has focused on discrete outcomes, such as deciding whether to grant someone a loan or not. In these classification settings, group fairness criteria such as independence, separation and sufficiency…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…
We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under…
With increasing volume of data being used across machine learning tasks, the capability to target specific subsets of data becomes more important. To aid in this capability, the recently proposed Submodular Mutual Information (SMI) has been…
We show that it is Unique Games-hard to approximate the maximum of a submodular function to within a factor 0.695, and that it is Unique Games-hard to approximate the maximum of a symmetric submodular function to within a factor 0.739.…
In this work, we investigate online mechanisms for trading time-sensitive valued data. We adopt a continuous function $d(t)$ to represent the data value fluctuation over time $t$. Our objective is to design an \emph{online} mechanism…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
Submodular functions are an important class of functions in combinatorial optimization which satisfy the natural properties of decreasing marginal costs. The study of these functions has led to strong structural properties with applications…
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…