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History-deterministic automata are a restricted class of nondeterministic automata where the nondeterminism while reading an input can be resolved successfully based on the prefix read so far. History-deterministic automata are…
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable payoff. Typically the payoff process of the max-player is assumed to be smaller than the payoff…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
A mobile agent navigating along edges of a simple connected graph, either finite or countably infinite, has to find an inert target (treasure) hidden in one of the nodes. This task is known as treasure hunt. The agent has no a priori…
The single- and multi- processor cup games can be used to model natural problems in areas such as processor scheduling, deamortization, and buffer management. At the beginning of the single-processor cup game, $n$ cups are initially empty.…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Shortest-path games are two-player zero-sum games played on a graph equipped with integer weights. One player, that we call Min, wants to reach a target set of states while minimising the total weight, and the other one has an antagonistic…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
First cycle games (FCG) are played on a finite graph by two players who push a token along the edges until a vertex is repeated, and a simple cycle is formed. The winner is determined by some fixed property Y of the sequence of labels of…
We consider a game in which players are the vertices of a directed graph. Initially, Nature chooses one player according to some fixed distribution and gives her a buck, which represents the request to perform a chore. After completing the…
An approximation algorithm for a constraint satisfaction problem is called robust if it outputs an assignment satisfying a $(1 - f(\epsilon))$-fraction of the constraints on any $(1-\epsilon)$-satisfiable instance, where the loss function…
We consider planning problems for graphs, Markov decision processes (MDPs), and games on graphs. While graphs represent the most basic planning model, MDPs represent interaction with nature and games on graphs represent interaction with an…
In this paper, we study algorithms for special cases of energy games, a class of turn-based games on graphs that show up in the quantitative analysis of reactive systems. In an energy game, the vertices of a weighted directed graph belong…
Weighted timed games are played by two players on a timed automaton equipped with weights: one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while reaching a target, while the other has an opposite objective. Used in a reactive synthesis…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. In this paper, we study the expected value of bounded quantitative prefix-independent objectives in the context of stochastic games. We…
We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
We investigate refinements of the mean-payoff criterion in two-player zero-sum perfect-information stochastic games. A strategy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal in the discounted game for all discount factors sufficiently close to $1$.…
We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the…
In the standard setting of approachability there are two players and a target set. The players play repeatedly a known vector-valued game where the first player wants to have the average vector-valued payoff converge to the target set which…