Related papers: Exit game with private information
We consider the exit problem for a one-dimensional system with random switching near an unstable equilibrium point of the averaged drift. In the infinite switching rate limit, we show that the exit time satisfies a limit theorem with a…
We introduce a new non-zero-sum game of optimal stopping with asymmetric exercise opportunities. Given a stochastic process modelling the value of an asset, one player observes and can act on the process continuously, while the other player…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…
This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
The coordinated and efficient distribution of limited resources by individual decisions is a fundamental, unsolved problem. When individuals compete for road capacities, time, space, money, goods, etc., they normally make decisions based on…
We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
Stochastic mathematical models are essential tools for understanding and predicting complex phenomena. The purpose of this work is to study the exit times of a stochastic dynamical system-specifically, the mean exit time and the…
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), based on rational expectations and market equilibrium, is the dominant perspective for modelling economic markets. However, the most notable critique of the EMH is the inability to model periods of…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…
Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum differential game in the case where a payoff is determined by the exit time, that is, the first time when the system leaves the game domain. Additionally, we assume that a part of domain's boundary is…
We consider the problem of decentralized power allocation for competitive rate-maximization in a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel uncertainty. We formulate a distribution-free robust framework for the…