Related papers: Cost Design in Atomic Routing Games

We consider an instance of a nonatomic routing game. We assume that the network is parallel, that is, constituted of only two nodes, an origin and a destination. We consider infinitesimal players that have a symmetric network cost, but are…

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates.…

We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…

We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…

In this paper, we propose a multi-player extension of the minimum cost flow problem inspired by a transportation problem that arises in modern transportation industry. We associate one player with each arc of a directed network, each trying…

In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…

We consider a class of multi-robot motion planning problems where each robot is associated with multiple objectives and decoupled task specifications. The problems are formulated as an open-loop non-cooperative differential game. A…

Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…

We study a routing game in which one of the players unilaterally acts altruistically by taking into consideration the latency cost of other players as well as his own. By not playing selfishly, a player can not only improve the other…

This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…

Inspired by the path coordination problem arising from robo-taxis, warehouse management, and mixed-vehicle routing problems, we model a group of heterogeneous players responding to stochastic demands as a congestion game under Markov…

Path planning is a fundamental and extensively explored problem in robotic control. We present a novel economic perspective on path planning. Specifically, we investigate strategic interactions among path planning agents using a game…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

This paper considers a 2-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…

Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…

We introduce a network design game where the objective of the players is to design the interconnections between the nodes of two different networks $G_1$ and $G_2$ in order to maximize certain local utility functions. In this setting, each…

Traditionally, most consumers of electricity pay for their consumptions according to a fixed rate. With the advancement of Smart Grid technologies, large-scale implementation of variable-rate metering becomes more practical. As a result,…